Knowledge - is it meaningful by itself?

I would like to follow up on Ami’s post, and in particular, his comment on Prasad’s assertion that “Advaita and Mīmāṃsā are agreed that action and cognition are not intrinsically able to change the content of the other.” (105) I also disagree, and I think some of the subsequent ideas presented in the text are also in opposition to this supposed lack of interdependence between cognition and action.

As Kumarila states, “it is accepted that lack of right cognition brings about wrong actions” (105). If this is the case, that right cognition brings about wrong action, than surely we can say that action follows from knowledge. But how can action follow from knowledge if the two are not able to intrinsically affect one another?

The idea that right cognition can enable right action but does no necessarily prevent wrong action is readily apparent. Knowing that Mcdonalds is unhealthy may allow you to resist eating a Big Mac, but this realization does not mean you cannot or will not succumb to temptation. This is further illuminated with Prasad’s comment that “One may know that gambling is ruinous and still gamble.” (105)

I simply do not see how one can make the jump from “knowledge (cognition) does not necessitate good decisions (action)” to “knowledge has no bearing on action”.  This thinking leads to one of two conclusions: either knowledge has no purpose because our actions are all that matter (we’ve all heard how actions speak louder than words…), or knowledge has some intrinsic value beyond any potential affect on action. Prasad certainly acknowledges the latter of these possibilities as he writes, “there undeniably are sacred texts which clearly assert that knowledge has its own

results”. (109) Yet even in these assertions knowledge is subordinate to action.

At the risk of devaluing action, I’d like to make an argument in favor of knowledge having intrinsic value independent of action. Take this class, for example. I’m certainly acquiring knowledge, but it would be a stretch to say that anything I learn about Eastern religions will have a bearing on my future actions. I simply derive satisfaction from the knowledge. “Knowledge acquired” is an argument in my utility function (for those not familiar with the concept, a utility function is a hypothetical model that seeks to quantify and aggregate everything that has a bearing on an individuals well being) that is independent of action. In other words, learning something or acquiring some piece of information does not have to lead to action for it to have value. While the Advaitic position is that knowledge “can lead to the attainment of the highest good” (115), I argue that knowledge can itself be a part of the highest good.