action and knowledge

This we learned two conflicting schools: Mimamsa and Vedanta, and their focus on knowledge and action to achieve liberation. Mimamsa argues that action plays a greater role than knowledge, criticizing that knowledge isn’t “enough,” and focuses on performing the correct ritualistic actions according to the religious text. Vedanta, on the other hand, claims that knowledge is only thing that matter, and it surmounts the importance of action. This seems too definitive, and as we know, nothing we learn in our class is simply black and white. While these two schools may have opposing and conflicting views, faith isn’t absolute. Also, liberation isn’t bound by time or space, so there is no causality; thus, these two schools’ claim that either knowledge or action is the answer for liberation seems to be simplified. There must be an interaction of knowledge and action; rather than having one or the other, having the degree of both. 

The Interplay Between Knowledge and Action

While covering Tuesday's reading in class, the concept that knowledge is action is quite an abstract and hypocritical to me. However, as i gained a greater understanding during class, I saw the connection between the two. The two contrasting view points about the relationship between knowledge and action, to me, represent the ongoing battle between the importance of ritual versus understanding. The mimamskasa believe that action takes a greater role than actual knowledge, putting a greater emphasis on religious ritual. The Vedantas stress the value of knowledge in relation to understanding the Upanishadic values. The thing that i found fascinating is that this struggle between the importance of ritual and understand still occurs in religion today. For example, within the christian tradition, the Catholic denomination stresses the importance of ritual within religious practice. This contrasts from the other christian denomination, such as the Quakers, which totally strip down the ritual to the bare minimum. This concept also relates to islamic tasfir in the sense that certain sects care more about interpretation and knowledge while others believe in literal practice. the point I'm am trying to make is that within certain religions, some followers practice without fully understanding why they practice it in a certain way, while other denominations focus more on understanding and how that translates into meaningful action.

Andrew

Knowledge - is it meaningful by itself?

I would like to follow up on Ami’s post, and in particular, his comment on Prasad’s assertion that “Advaita and Mīmāṃsā are agreed that action and cognition are not intrinsically able to change the content of the other.” (105) I also disagree, and I think some of the subsequent ideas presented in the text are also in opposition to this supposed lack of interdependence between cognition and action.

As Kumarila states, “it is accepted that lack of right cognition brings about wrong actions” (105). If this is the case, that right cognition brings about wrong action, than surely we can say that action follows from knowledge. But how can action follow from knowledge if the two are not able to intrinsically affect one another?

The idea that right cognition can enable right action but does no necessarily prevent wrong action is readily apparent. Knowing that Mcdonalds is unhealthy may allow you to resist eating a Big Mac, but this realization does not mean you cannot or will not succumb to temptation. This is further illuminated with Prasad’s comment that “One may know that gambling is ruinous and still gamble.” (105)

I simply do not see how one can make the jump from “knowledge (cognition) does not necessitate good decisions (action)” to “knowledge has no bearing on action”.  This thinking leads to one of two conclusions: either knowledge has no purpose because our actions are all that matter (we’ve all heard how actions speak louder than words…), or knowledge has some intrinsic value beyond any potential affect on action. Prasad certainly acknowledges the latter of these possibilities as he writes, “there undeniably are sacred texts which clearly assert that knowledge has its own

results”. (109) Yet even in these assertions knowledge is subordinate to action.

At the risk of devaluing action, I’d like to make an argument in favor of knowledge having intrinsic value independent of action. Take this class, for example. I’m certainly acquiring knowledge, but it would be a stretch to say that anything I learn about Eastern religions will have a bearing on my future actions. I simply derive satisfaction from the knowledge. “Knowledge acquired” is an argument in my utility function (for those not familiar with the concept, a utility function is a hypothetical model that seeks to quantify and aggregate everything that has a bearing on an individuals well being) that is independent of action. In other words, learning something or acquiring some piece of information does not have to lead to action for it to have value. While the Advaitic position is that knowledge “can lead to the attainment of the highest good” (115), I argue that knowledge can itself be a part of the highest good. 

Transcendence through negation?

In this week's post, I would like to address the concept of apophasis. Apophasis, as I understand it, is a form of negation. As discussed in Sells' excerpt, Mystical Languages of Unsaying, apophasis can specifically refer to a situation in which one states that a certain deity is "beyond names." Yet, by stating that this object/deity is beyond names, one is in essence naming that object/deity.

I would be lying if I said that I completely understood this concept - yet, I do find it extremely interesting. As we discussed in class, apophatic discourse creates a possibility of "transcendence." Such transcendence can occur by overcoming boundaries between the "self and other," among other pairings.

Some methods of apophatic discourse can focus on finding transcendent elements in mundane things, such as when one says "every kind act is an act of Christ." This, to me, seems an interesting method of "un-naming" something. By referring to multiple acts instead of a figure, one avoids giving a name to a specific diety and/or figure. One "un-names" the figure and attaches the essence that makes the figure so special (I couldn't think of a good word to put there) to everyday acts.

One of the other methods of "un-naming," however, seemed fairly ineffective to me. This method, as I understand, involves an un-ending series of actually un-naming something. For example: X is not...X is not... X is not... (and so on). To actually particpate in such an unending series of negations seems pointless to me - therefore, the purpose of these negations must be in the idea of the unending negation itself? I suppose, by this, I mean that one realizes that verbally un-naming something is ineffective and ultimately counterproductive. Thus, one realizes that actually "un-naming" something is a much deeper concept than the verbal act of "un-saying."

Like I said, I am rather fuzzy on this concept. I hope my line of reasoning made sense! Thoughts?

- Anne Reynolds

The primary theme of our discussion dealt with the purpose of reading sacred texts. What exactly does reading do? I wanted to focus on the question of the purpose of reading and its relation to religion as an entirety. The question "is the primary goal of a sacred text a kind of knowledge or a certain action?"(powerpoint), in my opinion, questions religion itself. When one practices a certain religion, is the knowledge he/she possess hold more importance than the religious practices themselves? But in order to perform these practices, one should possess a certain knowledge? What causes these differences in religious such as Hinduism and Buddhism? Personally, I believe a religion emerges from the knowledge based off another religion. However, the question that arises is if religious comparisons should be based upon ideologies or differences in practice?

Knowledge V. Action

It always comes down to the interpretation of religious texts - the Mimamsakas and Vedanatas differ on their views of the Vedas. The Mimamsakas emphasize the focus on rituals while the Vedantas focus on knowledge. To the Mimamsakas, knowledge isn't enough; while the Vedantas believe that knowledge is all that matters focusing on the Upanishadic values. Mimamsakas are liberated through the absence of attachment & bondage which is caused by actions. The Vedantas focus on the relationship between atman and brahman; a type of knowlege acquired outside of space and time.

So which is more important? Knowledge or action? It is believed that knowledge is a kind of action; a process that takes place in space and time. In grammatical analysis of text, action verbs are the most important. Are these arguments that action is more important? It seems that it comes to the chicken or the egg argument....

I found an interesting connection between this week's lesson on apophasis and last week's lesson on multiplism.  Apophatic discourse functions under the premise that a transcendental debate fluctuates between affirming and negating, defining and undefining, saying and "unsaying." Michael A. Sells states in his book, Mystical Languages of Unsaying, that “[r]eal contradictions occur when language engages the ineffable transcendent, but these contradictions are not illogical.” Sells' theory, as it is presented here, is intended to confuse the reader; the very idea that contradictions are not illogical is a foreign concept to conventional wisdom. Sells is determined to challenge that conventional wisdom and prove that contradictions are not inherently incompatible.

It seems to me, then, that principles of multiplism, as explained by Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, could come in handy while trying to reconcile illogical contradictions. Multiplism basically aims to settle people's conflicting beliefs by encouraging the adoption of an understanding that two completely contradictory schemas or world-views can exist within the same reality. In light of this, the idea of apophasis as a means to describe God seems a lot more manageable and less confusing.  God can be defined as everything and nothing simultaneously, and that is simply OK, because the fundamental parallel logic behind each theory (X is Y; RAB = Sa + Sb (or something like that), etc.) endorse a worldview in which contradictions are embraced and accepted as true.  It appears that both theories strive for the same thing and work under similar principles, even though their exact methods, goals, and purposes differ.

Knowledge and Action

As I was doing the readings for Tuesday, the concept of knowledge and action was striking but familiar at the same time. The question of whether a sacred text expects the reader to simply understand and know the information or to take a certain action was the main idea of the reading. This concept reminded me of the Bible verse that says that faith without works is nothing. In this Bible verse, the faith would be the knowledge of what to believe in and the works that it is referring to would be the actions. I don't think this Christian viewpoint would fit into either of the two views we talked about becomes it holds action and knowledge as both important.

The two views we learned about were Mimamsa, which holds that action is more important than knowledge, and Vedanta, which holds knowledge as being more important than actions. However, we went over the fact in class that it's more complicated than that. I understand the idea that how one understands what one's doing changes the nature of the action. For example, if you're doing something but you don't know why you are doing it or what it means it is useless and meaningless. You need to understand and have the knowledge of what you are doing in order for the action to be worth something.

However, I did not fully understand if unsaying was related to this idea of knowledge and action or not and I was also confused about the apophatic discourse from Sells' writing.

After yesterday's class I began to think about how both knowledge and action played a role in my life.  More importantly, I began to consider how the combination of knowledge and action played a role in my life.  Advaita and Mīmāṃsā agree that, "Action and cognition cannot in themselves change the other" (Ram-Prasad 105).  I disagree because I believe that not only do they have the ability to change the other, but that this ability is actually incredibly beneficial in understanding and perfecting a concept.

I played four years of varsity soccer in high school.  I was a defender, and every single year for the first two weeks of preseason, our coach made us learn, review, and review again, the fundamentals of defense.  By the end of the two weeks, every defender knew every little thing about how to operate the defense, but this information only goes so far.  In our first scrimmage, the opposing team scored an early goal because one of the freshman defenders didn't cover for the first defender on a counter attack.  The freshman knew that he should have covered for the defender, so why didn't he?  Because this was his first varsity game, and he needed some prior experience before feeling comfortable with this type of defense.  This is how I view the relationship between action and cognition.  Cognition is important, but if you lack the ability to apply this knowledge, it's worthless.  Knowledge is only beneficial if action performed correctly.  I agree that knowing how to play defense is different than playing defense, but only when the knowledge of defense is combined with the action of defense, can the concept of defense be correctly applied.  There are hundreds of examples in my life where action without knowledge, and knowledge without action is useless, and only until I utilize both I am effective in performing the task.  I do believe that action and cognition are intrinsically able to change the content of the other, and that this interaction allows you to have more of a well-rounded grasp on a concept.

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I have an exam tonight, so I would like to use my free pass!
Thanks

Lybroan James and the Perpetually Evolving Reality

Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad writes that “Advaita and Mīmāsā are agreed that action and cognition are not intrinsically able to change the content of the other.” (Ram-Prasad  105) I disagree. The two are each half of a perpetually evolving reality. Knowledge and action are not mutually exclusive. They can shape one another. Moreover, one does not take epistemological precedence over the other.

I had a high school algebra teacher named Lybroan James. Lybroan employed several unconventional methods, but maintained one fundamental rule: if you could teach a concept to another student, and the other student consequently understood it, you yourself understood the concept. That was an A+ for the day, because Lybroan knew that action and knowledge are perpetually reciprocal.

Kumarila argues that simply acknowledging (knowing) that something is wrong is not grounds to stop partaking in it. Sankara asserts that a mistaken belief, idea, or thought isn’t going to be offset by an action, but by new or further elucidated knowledge.

My question for both: why not? If I have been adding 5 plus 5 to find that the sum is 9, then I am – in mathematics parlance – wrong. If my math teacher corrects me, and illuminates for me what I’ve been doing wrong and how exactly I need to go about getting 10 as the answer, then my actions have been corrected and bettered by knowledge. I will ultimately, necessarily stop partaking in the wrong action. Further, my teacher’s action of correcting me offsets what had been a false belief.

Might it be the restrictive, categorical nature of these assertions and questions that are most problematic?

knowledge is an action

In class we talked about the concept of how knowledge can be an action and how"action facilitates (the acquisition of knowledge) from a distance" (Ram-Prasad 114) I like this. To me this is analogous to the democratization of heaven that happened in the second great awakening, however this concept is merely ingrained into the practice itself. I say these two ideas are simliar because both enable every human being the ability to achieve their goal, on one hand the entrance to heaven and on the other the attainment of knowledge. To venture away from the analogy the view of knowledge as an action implies that knowledge must be learned, it does not account for the natural acquirement of knowledge. Once again I like this. I like this because, to me, this is saying what I'd like to believe all of us have been thinking for years. Ignorant people are simply lazy. Of course like any other action some people will be naturally gifted at said action, but this does not discount the fact that knowledge happens to everyone and at their choosing as well. This means that the person with the "Romney (or Obama or whoever) is a Nazi" sign that seems to be standing outside of every presidential debate is simply obese with ignorance. They have put off working out their brain for far too long and now they are a gelatinous sack of partisan stances and unoriginal opinions. Unfortunately for us we have seen how we deal with real obesity in this country and I fear intellectual obesity will be no different. No matter, skinny people will carry on as they always have, side by side with obesity trying their hardest to not draw attention to it, we can only dream that someday Richard Simmons might take off the leotard and read us all Shakespeare instead.

The relationship between knowledge and action

At the beginning of class, we started with a few questions about what readings do. The question that struck me as most interesting was, “What is the relationship between knowledge obtained through sacred texts and the actions one takes based on them?” and the interaction between knowledge and action. We spoke about two different views, the Mimamsa and the Advaita Vedanta. Mimamsa views action as more important than knowledge whereas Vedanta views knowledge as more important than action. Kumarila, a mimamsika thinks that knowledge is not enough and Sankara, a vidantin thinks that knowledge is all that really matters. Kumarila suggests that actions are influenced by other actions and knowledge influences in a secondary way. Kumarila says that liberation can be reached through action. On the other hand,  Sankara says that liberation is the knowledge of identifying the atman and brahman and that liberation is a specific kind of knowledge that can only be reached through understanding. Both view knowledge and action as independent of each other. However, to start to answer the question that was posed in the beginning of class, the relationship between knowledge and action is that knowledge is a kind of action and a process. When thinking about what Sells says, we can look at apophatic discourse in understanding knowledge as an action. Apophatic discourse creates the possibility of surpassing these distinctions between self and other, knowing and doing, etc. I’m still working on understanding the entire concept of apophatic discourse, but it makes more sense when thinking of knowledge as a kind of action and that it is not as simple as having them each exist independently. Feel free to comment if you have other thoughts regarding this idea!

Extraordinary vs. Common

While reading Sells’ Mystical Languages of Unsaying, the concept of ”Mysticism and Unsaying” particularly caught my attention.  On page 7, it reads “In apophatic mystical texts, there is indeed a sense of extraordinary but the extraordinary, the transcendent, the unimaginable, reveals itself as the common.”  Immediately after reading this part, various questions popped into my mind.

Doesn’t the classification of “extraordinary” and “common” rely on relativeness?  A person might come across something that is unusual and completely unheard of, which makes that phenomenon extraordinary in his or her eyes.  However, someone who witnessed such occurrence frequently may be unaffected by it and just consider it common in his or her mind.  So shouldn’t the distinction between these two terms varies and differs when taking into account the individual (or group) experiencing a happening?  It is all relative to the person.  For example, when I walk around Times Square in New York City, I see the awestruck faces of those first time visitors and tourists – it is extraordinary.  For me, on the other hand, I am unaffected and rather jaded by the sight – it is common.  We are both experiencing the same event, yet different reactions arise among us.  Thus, how can something be strictly labeled extraordinary and common?

If we strip down the “amazing event” to its bare minimum, is all that is left just a “simple act” that we overhype?  I believe that Sells mentioned on page 7 that the one birth of the son of God, as astounding as that sounds, is truly just familiar act.  Essentially, it is the birth of another baby.  Nothing new here.  The fact that it is of a specific figure, however, is what makes this particular birth significant in our eyes.

Ultimately, my curiosity lies in distinguishing the “extraordinary” and the “common.”

What makes a true follower?

     While reading Saeed's analysis of the Qur'an, the section on ethico-legal teachings caught my eye. Saeed provides the reader with thorough descriptions of the five different types of teachings: obligatory, fundamental, protectional, implementational and instructional.  These days, it can be quite difficult for every follower of Islam to follow these teachings. Due to the complexity of these teachings, when individuals do not follow certain types of teachings, have they jeopardized themselves for Judgement Day? Are there certain type of actions that can "replace" or "outweigh" others? Is there a concept similar to dharma/karma in Islam?
          In opinion, when one follows a religion I believe there should be few mandatory duties to that follower, such as prayer. However, I do not believe one cannot practice a specific religion if he or she does not obey every rule/teaching. Is there a certain threshold of religious practice that promotes as a religious follower of a certain religion, or is it "the thought that counts"? While the "...Qur'an's main emphasis is on the relationship with His creation, rather than on providing detailed regulation for daily life," how much is an individual expected to follow the scriptures of the Qur'an to label him/her as a true follower of Islam?

"However, being laws of divine origin, there is an implicit assumption that they are static and unalterable. Hence amendments through legislative acts of government, or developments through judicial precedent, may not be permitted, although changes through evolving interpretations may be possible," (Saeed 162)

The laws are static and unalterable but changes through evolving interpretations may be possible. To me this statement is contradictory. If the law is a guide for both individual behavior and government, how is one exclusive from the other? I understand the context or its attempt to keep government and religion separate, but if "the purpose of these laws may range from providing purely individual moral guidance, to forming the basis of a nation’s legal system," then an 'amendment' is a sheer 'evolving interpretation.' The two still seem synonymous, although is it was interpreted likewise then the gov't could abuse their power...

Thou shall not... what? A Skeptic's Take on Shari'a Law

For this week’s blog post, I thought I would discuss my thoughts on the idea of religious law, specifically, shari’a law.

To start out, I would like to mention that I really enjoyed the reading this week. Something about this author just resonated with me. Perhaps it was the fact that all the major points were summarized at the end of the article. 

Regardless, one of the sections that most interested me was “Scripture and Religious Law.” The article begins off with an explanation of religious law, stating “religious law is thus understood to be revealed by God, and designed to govern human affairs.” Therefore, since religious law is of “divine origin, there is an implicit assumption that they are static and unalterable,” although change is possible through “evolving interpretations.”

This idea of “evolving interpretations” is where I begin to become skeptical. I understand  the concept of people observing a sacred text as law, but where does interpretation come into play? When should we stop or start interpreting the text literally? Do religious teachings “transcend cultural specificity and apply to all Muslims regardless of time, place and circumstances?” How can a person, even a religious scholar, have the power to change the way we look at God?

One the same token, how can one ignore the obvious inconsistencies in the text? How can one, dedicated to the “protection of life,” seemingly accept slavery? Or one, dedicated to “honor,” have multiple wives? 

When dealing with the nuances of daily life rather than philosophical ideals, the time and context when the Qur’an was written becomes far more apparent.