There is no such thing as "too secular"

In our discussion of multiplism several weeks ago I brought up the fixed point theorem and how I think it may in certain circumstances apply to societies: we tend to converge to a set of agreed upon principles regarding what is acceptable and what is not. Ami makes an interesting point in noting, “retrospect invariably frowns upon colonialism”.  I’ll take it one step further and say that in the year 2012, colonialism is frowned upon, in general.  I think we have converged or are close to converging to a fixed point in which the standard is you don’t colonize other peoples.

Perhaps this is the crux of many of the problems in the middle-east; most of the world has gotten over colonialism while some middle-eastern countries lag behind. But if this is the case, it’s largely just a matter of timing. As Ramadan asks “can the Arab individual in particular, and Muslims in general, emerge as subjects of  their own history?” (97) The Islamist countries have arguably, for the first time in their history, acquired the resources and power to no longer be subjects of the west. They have the power to fight back. And if emerging as subjects of their own history means making others their subject, and making others conform to their principles, however extreme, that’s a frightening thought.

But I think it’s only a frightening thought if religious Islamic extremism becomes political Islamic extremism. There will always be people in every society whose beliefs are fundamentally at odds with the majority; the problems arise when the extremists become powerful political leader. This is essentially what has happened in Iran.

Ramadan makes a case for Turkey as an example of a country that has made progress under Islamist rule. He reasons that “Islam is acceptable, and can be assimilated into the respectable categories of political science, on condition that it accepts the laws of the market” (101). Acceptable? Sure. Helpful? Unlikely. There are countless examples of religious extremism and theocratic rule turning out poorly. I can think of no examples of a time when a society failed because it was too secular.

Ramadan can present countless examples of pro-capitalist, pro-progress Islamist regimes, but that won’t change the fact that there are examples of Islamist regimes that have failed or stirred controversy precisely because of their Islamism. Such is not the case with secular governments.

I also think Ramdan’s criticism of social media is entirely misplaced. He writes, “how sad it would be if ultimately the "Arab awakening" amounted to nothing more than the uprising of a leisure class of young people who enjoy access to the Internet and to social networks, who demand political freedom, but who have forgotten the poor and the downtrodden in their own societies” (115). I think social media does the just the opposite. It makes people (particularly young people) more involved in fighting for social issues because they have such an accessibly outlet for doing so. Ramadan calls for “active participation of the citizens” (115), but fails to realize that the Internet allows, even encourages, this very active participation that he speaks of.